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On August 20, 1998, Salah Idris, described by the Wall Street Jour-
nal as "a fortune-charmed millionaire of the kind the Middle East often
produces," encountered a few problems: His factory was destroyed, his
account with a U.S. bank was frozen, and he was "fingered by U.S.
intelligence authorities as a presumed front man for Islamic fundamen-
talist terrorist Osama bin Laden."' Idris had paid $12 million and
assumed $18 million of debt to become the essential owner of El-Shifa
Pharmaceuticals Industries Company in Khartoum, Sudan.2 El-Shifa
was the largest producer of malaria tablets in Africa3 and had received
approval by U.S. officials for a United Nations contract to ship veteri-
nary medicine to Iraq as part of the Oil-for-Food Program.4
On August 7, 1998, in near simultaneous attacks, U.S. Embassies in
Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania were attacked by truck
bombs.' In an effort to retaliate, President Clinton personally targeted
El-Shifa and a terrorist base in Afghanistan as enemy property. 6 Toma-
hawk cruise missiles subsequently bombed and destroyed the facilities.7
In addressing the nation after the attack, President Clinton explained that
intelligence reports indicated the plant was manufacturing a component
of nerve gas for terrorists, and that the destruction was a necessary act of
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1. Daniel Pearl, In Sudanese Bombing, 'Evidence' Depends on Who Is Viewing It, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 28, 1998, at Al.
2. Id.
3. James Bovard, Dodj Vu Five Years Before Iraq, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2003, at B4.
4. Doug Bandow, Op-Ed., Making It Right in Sudan; U.S. Owes Damages for
Pharmaceutical Bombing, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2001, at A21.
5. Ken Fireman, U.S. Strikes Back, NEWSDAY (New York), Aug. 21, 1998, at A3; see also
El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States (EI-Shifa 1), 55 Fed. Cl. 751, 753 (2003).
6. EI-Shifa 1, 55 Fed. Cl. at 753.
7. Id.
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national defense.8 Four days later, the United States froze $24 million
of Idris's assets, which he had deposited in Bank of America.9
Naturally, El-Shifa filed a complaint in the Court of Federal Claims
seeking $50 million in damages as compensation for the destruction of
the plant by the United States.1" Congressman Dana Rohrabacher (R-
Cal.) introduced legislation to reimburse Idris, but other legislators were
hesitant to take on the controversy." Alternatively, Representative Roh-
rabacher proposed a resolution asking the Court of Federal Claims to
investigate Idris's claim.' 2 In the Court of Federal Claims, El-Shifa
argued that it was the largest pharmaceutical-manufacturing company in
Sudan; that the plant supplied drugs to the impoverished people living in
that country; and "that it had no connection whatsoever to chemical
weapons, Osama bin Laden or international terrorism."' 3 The Court of
Federal Claims found in favor of the government on the ground that the
Takings Clause did not "extend to claims arising out of military opera-
tions against enemy war-making instrumentalities."' 4 El-Shifa appealed,
claiming that the designation of its property as an enemy war-making
facility was made on the basis of "erroneous intelligence." 5 On appeal,
8. The facilities were linked to Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda terrorist network and the strikes
were ordered, according to President Clinton, for four reasons: First, because the President had
convincing evidence that these groups played a key role in the Embassy bombings; second,
because these groups had executed terrorist attacks against Americans in the past; third, because
there was compelling information that the groups were planning additional terrorist attacks;
fourth, because the groups were seeking to acquire chemical and other dangerous weapons.
Remarks in Martha's Vineyard, Massachusetts, on Military Action Against Terrorist Sites in
Afghanistan and Sudan, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1460 (Aug. 20, 1998); see also President's Radio Address,
2 PuB. PAPERS 1464 (Aug. 22, 1998) (noting that the purpose of the strike was to "destroy, in
Sudan [a] factory with which bin Ladin's network is associated, which was producing an
ingredient essential for nerve gas"); Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Military Action
Against Terrorist Sites in Afghanistan and Sudan, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1464 (Aug. 21, 1998) (stating
that the strikes were ordered "pursuant to [his] constitutional authority [as President] to conduct
U.S. Foreign relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive"); Address to the Nation
on Military Action Against Terrorist Sites in Afghanistan and Sudan, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1460, 1461
(Aug. 20, 1998) (describing the target as an enemy-related facility that posed an "immediate
threat" to the United States).
9. Bandow, supra note 4; see also Marc Lacey, Khartoum Journal; Look at the Place!
Sudan Says, 'Say Sorry,' But U.S. Won't, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2005, at A4.
10. El-Shifa 1, 55 Fed. Cl. at 754.
11. H.R. 5290, 106th Cong. (2000); Bandow, supra note 4.
12. H.R.J. Res. 593, 106th Cong. (2000); Bandow, supra note 4.
13. El Shifa I, 55 Fed. Cl. at 754; Sudanese Pharmaceutical Plant Owner Sues U.S. for
Bombing, TEHRAN TIMES, July 29, 2000, available at 2000 WLNR 7947971.
14. El-Shifa 1, 55 Fed. Cl. at 755-56, 774 (concluding that a court could not "look behind the
President's discharge of his Constitutional duties as Commander in Chief, including his
declaration of what constitutes an enemy target and his determination to use military force to
destroy that target").
15. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 1, EI-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States (EI-Shifa
11), 378 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (No. 03-5098) (arguing that "[i]n the face of widespread
criticism of the attack on the EI-Shifa plant, the Government publicly abandoned its initial
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the Federal Circuit affirmed, noting that enemy property can be
destroyed without just compensation.' 6 In addition, the Federal Circuit
held that the political-question doctrine barred review of the President's
designation of E1-Shifa as enemy property.' 7 According to the opinion,
the President's power to designate the private property of an alien situ-
ated on foreign soil as enemy property is textually committed to the
executive branch.' 8
In deciding whether the destruction of property targeted as enemy,
owned by nonresidents and located abroad, constitutes a compensable
taking, the Federal Circuit created a new doctrine. The opinion is the
first time a court refers to the existence of an enemy-property doctrine.19
In fact, the line of cases cited by the Federal Circuit as part of the
enemy-property doctrine corresponds primarily to two separate military-
takings principles: the military-necessity doctrine and the alien-enemy
disability rule.2"
justifications for the attack, and in this suit it has carefully avoided stating whether the plant was
in fact involved in the production of chemical weapons or connected to international terrorism").
The smoking gun leading to the initial justifications for the attack was a soil sample taken by a
foreign agent from an area near the plant more than seven months before the attacks. Id. at 8. El-
Shifa argued that EMPTA, the nerve gas allegedly found in the facility, has innocent commercial
uses and is chemically similar to pesticides commonly used in both Africa and the United States.
Id. at 8-10.
16. EI-Shifa 11, 378 F.3d at 1348, 1360-61.
17. Id. at 1365. The political-question doctrine directs a court to abstain from addressing the
merits of the dispute on the basis that the Constitution has committed final interpretive authority to
one of the political branches of the government. Id.; see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217
(1962) (setting forth six tests for determining the presence of a nonjusticiable political question
including "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department").
18. The Federal Circuit found the President's power to make extraterritorial enemy-property
designations as a necessary part of the President's power to wage war. El-Shifa I1, 378 F.3d at
1363-64. In the words of the EI-Shifa H court: "We cannot envision how a military commander,
much less the Commander-in-Chief, could wage war successfully if he did not have the inherent
power to decide what targets, i.e., property, belonged to the enemy and could therefore be
destroyed free form takings liability." Id. at 1364.
19. Id. at 1356-57, 1359.
20. The Federal Circuit cited Perrin v. United States, 4 Ct. Cl. 543, 543 (1868) at length-
Perrin discusses the principles of military necessity and the alien-enemy doctrine. El-Shifa II, 378
F.3d at 1356 ("Perrin was the first case in which the outlines of an enemy property doctrine
applicable to takings jurisprudence can be recognized.") (citations omitted); id. at 1357 ("The
Supreme Court applied enemy property doctrine to a number of military takings cases that
followed Perrin.") (citation omitted). In addition, the Federal Circuit discussed United States v.
Pacific Railroad, 120 U.S. 227, 228-31 (1887), which addressed the military-necessity doctrine.
EI-Shifa II, 378 F.3d at 1359 (citing United States v. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 154
(1952)) (noting that "nearly seventy years later, the Court confirmed that the Pacific Railroad
Court's discussion of the enemy property doctrine was in fact the law of the land"). With respect
to the alien-enemy disability rule, the Federal Circuit relied on Juragua Iron Co. v. United States,
212 U.S. 297, 297 (1909) and Seery v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 601, 605-06 (Ct. Cl. 1955)
among other cases. El-Shifa 11, 378 F.3d at 1357.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
This note attempts to ascertain the meaning of the enemy-property
doctrine by examining and surveying the history of its components. Part
II of this note provides a contextual background, including a brief over-
view of the Takings Clause. Part III surveys the military-necessity doc-
trine and its relationship to the Federal Circuit's assemblage of the
enemy-property doctrine. Part IV discusses the alien-enemy disability
rule and its effect on the opinion in El-Shifa. Part V explores the appli-
cability of the Takings Clause to nonresident aliens whose property is
located abroad. Finally, Part VI scrutinizes the treatment of the enemy-
property doctrine as a novel principle and analyzes its potential applica-
tion to future cases.
II. CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND
"Every civilized State recognizes its obligation to make compensa-
tion for private property taken under pressure of State necessity, and for
the public good."'" In the United States, this compensation is provided
pursuant to the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Con-
stitution.2 "The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private property
shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation was
designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole."23 The Takings Clause does not qualify what is
meant by "private property," indicate that it must be located in a certain
country, or say that it is only available to U.S. citizens.24 Hence,
whether a Fifth Amendment takings claim is colorable depends on the
particular circumstances of each case.25
A taking can occur simply when the government deprives property
owners of all or most of their interest.2 6 It is not necessary for the gov-
ernment to take actual possession of the property. For instance, a Fifth
Amendment taking can occur if the government deprives a property
owner of property use,27 or if the government allows someone else to
benefit from or use the property of another.28 However, "the constitu-
21. Grant v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 41, 43 (1863).
22. "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CoNsT.
amend. V.
23. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
24. EI-Shifa II, 378 F.3d at 1351.
25. United States v. Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958).
26. See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).
27. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266-67 (1946) (finding that frequent flights
immediately above a landowner's property constituted a taking).
28. See, e.g., Eyherabide v. United States, 345 F.2d 565, 570 (Ct. Cl. 1965) ("If the
Government's encroachments on private property make it possible for another to get the benefits
[Vol. 62:601
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tional requirement of compensation when property is taken cannot be
pressed to its grammatical extreme; ... some play must be allowed to
the joints if the machine is to work. ' 29 For instance, courts have found
that regulations that merely deprive owners of the most profitable use of
their property are insufficient to establish a right to compensation.3 °
In the military context, foreign-owned property located within the
United States3" and foreign property owned by U.S. citizens,32 both fall
within the ambit of the Takings Clause. However, in terms of compen-
sation, property located outside the United States or property that is not
owned by a U.S. citizen is limited by alien-enemy principles and the
military-necessity doctrine.33 "It is axiomatic that the fifth amendment
is not suspended in wartime, but it is equally well recognized that a
destruction of private property in battle or by enemy forces is not com-
pensable."34 Therefore, to decide whether a military-takings case
presents a claim under the Takings Clause, courts look to decisional-law
principles to distinguish the losses that are necessary incidents of war
from those situations where property is taken for public use.35 In El-
Shifa, this decisional law was collectively considered as the "enemy
property doctrine."36
III. THE MILITARY-NECESSITY DOCTRINE
Although the doctrine of military necessity is more than 200 years
old,3 7 the Federal Circuit in EI-Shifa refers to military-necessity case law
of that property, the United States is liable just as if it used the property for itself.") (citation
omitted).
29. Tyson & Brother-United Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 445-46
(1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
30. Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. at 168 (citations omitted) (noting that courts have
been reluctant to require compensation to be paid for regulations that result in losses of income
because temporary wartime economic restrictions are insignificant when compared to the
widespread uncompensated loss of life and freedom of action, which war traditionally demands).
31. In Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 489-92 (1931), the U.S.
Supreme Court found that a Russian corporation that assigned contracts for the construction of
two vessels was owed just compensation under the Fifth Amendment when the United States
requisitioned the contracts and the vessels for its use. The property was located in the United
States at the time of the taking. Id. at 487.
32. See, e.g., Seery v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 601, 603-04 (Ct. Cl. 1955) (rejecting
argument that takings claim by naturalized U.S. citizen should be dismissed because the property
was located in Austria).
33. See, e.g., Nat'l Bd. of Young Men's Christian Ass'ns v. United States, 396 F.2d 467, 470
(Ct. Cl. 1968).
34. El-Shifa I1, 378 F.3d 1346, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Nat'l Bd. of Young Men's
Christian Ass'ns, 396 F.2d at 470) (emphasis omitted).
35. Id. (quoting Nat'l Bd. of Young Men's Christian Ass'ns, 396 F.2d at 470).
36. Id. at 1358, 1361.
37. See Burrus M. Carnahan, Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War: The Origins and Limits of
the Principle of Military Necessity, 92 Am. J. INT'L L. 213, 214-15 (1998) (explaining how the
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as outlining the "enemy property doctrine applicable to takings jurispru-
dence."38  To discern whether the Federal Circuit's interpretation of
military necessity as part of the enemy-property doctrine is a logical
extension, an examination of the precedent forming the military-neces-
sity doctrine is essential.
Military necessity is a limited emergency power that exculpates the
government from having to pay just compensation for the taking of
property.39 The doctrine allows property to be lawfully taken or
destroyed to prevent it from falling into enemy hands, or as is necessary
to protect the state or its citizens.4 0
Military necessity has also been interpreted as involving the neces-
sity of those measures that are indispensable for securing the ends of
war, "which are lawful according to modern usage and usages of war."41
Military necessity is different from force majeure; the former always
involves a deliberate choice to disregard a rule, while the latter includes
only extraneous events that make performance impossible.42 Although
the doctrine has been criticized as providing a pretext for a "barbarous
system of warfare,"43 military necessity has been applied to rules of self-
defense,44 treatment of the wounded,45 military commissions,46 and pri-
concept of military necessity was outlined in the Lieber Code in the eighteenth century and
applied as early as 1868 to ban the use of small-caliber explosive bullets).
38. Id. at 1356 (citing Perrin v. United States, 4 Ct. Cl. 543, 543 (1868)).
39. Perrin, 4 Ct. Cl. at 547-48.
40. United States v. Pac. R.R., 120 U.S. 227, 239 (1887) (finding the government not
responsible "for injuries to or destruction of private property in necessary military operations
during the civil war").
41. Brief of Amicus Curiae National Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support of
Petitioner/Appellee Urging Affirmance at 5-6, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (No. 04-5393) (citation omitted) [hereinafter Brief of National Ass'n of Criminal Defense
Lawyers]. The Petitioner further argued that "military necessity is limited by the law of war and
is not a blank check for unfettered Executive action." Id. at 6; see also U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY,
THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, FIELD MANUAL No. 27-10 (1956) (defining military necessity as a
"principle which justifies those measures not forbidden by international law which are
indispensable for securing the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible").
42. Carnahan, supra note 37, at 218 n.32.
43. RICHARD SHELLY HARTIGAN, LIEBER'S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 123 (1983) (quoting
Confederate Secretary of War, James A. Seddon).
44. Major David L. Willson, An Army View of Neutrality in Space: Legal Options for Space
Negation, 50 A.F. L. REv. 175, 210 (2001) (noting that "if all other methods have failed or are
futile, the requirement of necessity in self-defense will be automatically satisfied").
45. Stephen W. Simpson, Shoot First, Ask Questions Later: Double-Tapping Under the Laws
of War, 108 W. VA. L. REV. 751, 760 (2006) (recognizing that the obligation to take in the
wounded in the Lieber Code contained a caveat for military necessity).
46. Brief of National Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers, supra note 41, at 8 n.33
(" 'Military Commissions, for the trial of offenders against the laws of war ... [are] founded in
necessity"' (quoting MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES 6 (1908 ed.)).
[Vol. 62:601
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vate property.47
The military-necessity doctrine had rough beginnings. In the early
1800s the U.S. Supreme Court did not recognize military necessity as a
military power. In Brown v. United States," a case that has not been
overruled since it was decided in 1812, Chief Justice Marshall found that
the laws of war gave "to the sovereign full right to take the persons and
confiscate the property of the enemy wherever found."4 9 In fact, the
opinion specified that "[t]he mitigations of this rigid rule, which the
humane and wise policy of modem times has introduced into practice,
will more or less affect the exercise of this right, but cannot impair the
right itself."5 A showing of necessity was not a requirement to justify-
ing a taking without compensation. Instead, the authority to confer the
power of confiscation of enemy property rested in the legislature.5" "The
rule which we apply to the property of our enemy, will be applied by
him to the property of our citizens. . . . [Thus,] [i]t is proper for the
consideration of the legislature, not of the executive or judiciary.'"52
Hence, the procedure outlined by Chief Justice Marshall for the
confiscation of property included a declaration of war and a legislative
act showing congressional intent to confiscate the property of enemies
found within the United States.53 This procedure was fashioned using
principles of international law, which Marshall saw as premised on con-
cers of international comity. 4 According to Marshall,
a construction ought not lightly to be admitted which would give to a
declaration of war an effect in this country that it does not possess
elsewhere, and which would fetter that exercise of entire discretion
respecting enemy property, which may enable the government to
apply to the enemy the rule that applies to us.55
47. United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 623, 628 (1871) (finding that an emergency
must be shown to exist before the taking of property can be justified).
48. 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814).
49. Id. at 122; see also Charles A. Flint, Challenging the Legality of Section 106 of the USA
PATRIOT Act, 67 ALB. L. REV. 1183, 1184-85 (2004) (discussing the same powers under Brown
as well as under the PATRIOT Act).
50. Brown, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 122-23.
51. Id. at 129 (finding that the lack of a legislative act showing congressional will to
confiscate British property found on U.S. land precluded condemnation as enemy's property).
52. Id. at 128-29. The Court also stated that "when the sovereign authority shall chuse [sic]
to bring it into operation, the judicial department must give effect to its will. But until that will
shall be expressed, no power of condemnation can exist in the court." Id. at 123.
53. Id. at 125-29.
54. Marshall relied on theories contained in EMMERICH DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS
(Joseph Chitty, ed., T. & J.W. Johnson 1852) (1758) to explain that the Constitution was framed at
a time when principles of international law had been "received throughout the civilized world."
Id. at 125; see also Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 20
(2006) (citing Brown, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 125).
55. Brown, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 125.
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Looking at the Constitution itself, he added, this general reasoning is
much strengthened by the words of the instrument. 56
The unfettered discretion to enjoy enemy property was put to rest in
1863 when President Lincoln commissioned the earliest official codifi-
cation of the laws of war, which included the military-necessity doc-
trine.57 The Lieber Code, named after a professor of law at Columbia
College (now Columbia University), was a response to the expansion of
the U.S. Army during the Civil War and provided a standard for inexpe-
rienced officers to follow.58 The Code, "a comprehensive body of prin-
ciples governing the conduct of belligerents in enemy territory,"59
contained an "open-ended definition of military necessity. '60 The recog-
nition of military necessity as a prerequisite for destruction represented
an "enlightened advance in the laws of war.' 61
According to the Code, "[m]ilitary necessity, as understood by
modem civilized nations, consists in the necessity of those measures
which are indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which are
lawful according to the modem law and usages of war."'62 Article 15
limited the concept, noting that " it allows of all destruction of property,
and obstruction of the ways and channels of traffic, travel, or communi-
cation, and of all withholding of sustenance or means of life from the
enemy; of the appropriation of whatever an enemy's country affords
necessary for the subsistence and safety of the army. '63 Lieber's Code
broadly construed the concept of military necessity, but at the same time
limited its reach, requiring that military necessity be lawful according to
the evolving modem laws of war.
In addition to the Lieber Code, The Prize Cases substantially con-
tributed to the formation of the military-necessity doctrine. 64 The Prize
Cases, which were the first to coin "[e]nemies' property" as a technical
phrase,65 considered the enemy status of property that was apparently
owned by neutrals, not actual enemies.66 One of the cases involved a
56. Id.
57. Carnahan, supra note 37, at 213.
58. Flint, supra note 49, at 1190.
59. John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property, 80 AM. J. INT'L
L. 831, 834 (1986).
60. Chris af Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History of
the Laws of War, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 49, 65-66 (1994).
61. Carnahan, supra note 37, at 217.
62. Id. at 215.
63. Id. at 216.
64. The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 635 (1862).
65. See EI-Shifa I, 378 F.3d 1346, 1356 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting The Prize Cases, 67
U.S. (2 Black) at 674).
66. 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 666, 680.
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merchant vessel from Richmond, Virginia.67 The Quaker city captured
the vessel, and the President treated it as a prize of war.68 The vessel's
registered owners, who were Virginia residents, denied involvement
with the Civil War or hostility to the government.69 Nevertheless, the
U.S. Supreme Court upheld President Lincoln's Civil War blockade and
denied just compensation.7 ° The Court noted that "[t]he right of one
belligerent not only to coerce the other by direct force, but also to crip-
ple his resources by the seizure or destruction of his property, is a neces-
sary result of a state of war."71 It is of no consequence whether the
property belongs to an ally or a citizen;72 whether the property owner
was a naturalized citizen of the enemy; whether he was loyal to the
enemy; or whether the property would have benefited the enemy or, if
captured, injured the enemy.7 3 Instead, "[t]he test is whether the resi-
dence of the owner is under the established de facto jurisdiction and
control of the enemy.... It is the illegal traffic that stamps it as enemies'
property,' 74 and it is the laws of war that recognize the right to reduce
the power of the enemy, including money, wealth, and products of agri-
culture and commerce as necessary.75
By 1863 Lincoln had ordered federal commanders to "seize and use
any property, real or personal, which may be necessary or convenient for
their several commands, as supplies, or for other military purposes. '"76
Then, in his defense of the Emancipation Proclamation as a proper war
measure, Lincoln argued that depriving the enemy of usable resources,
including slaves, was justified by the military-necessity doctrine:
The most that can be said, if so much, is, that slaves are property. Is
there-has there ever been-any question that by the law of war,
property, both of enemies and friends, may be taken when needed?
And is it not needed whenever taking it, helps us, or hurts the enemy?
Armies, the world over, destroy enemies' property when they can not
use it; and even destroy their own to keep it from the enemy.77
The continually expanding reach of the concept of military necessity
may support the assertion that the doctrine was used as a pretext for
67. Id. at 637.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 671-72.
71. Id. at 671.
72. Id. at 674.
73. Id. at 651.
74. Id. at 658, 674.
75. Id. at 671-72.
76. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859-1865, at 342-43 (Library of Am. ed.,
1989).
77. Id. at 497 (emphasis added).
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mischief.78 In addition, as evidenced by later cases, Lincoln's strategy
during the Civil War helped create and shape the doctrine of military
necessity.
Courts began to award compensation and to consider the property
of friendly or loyal individuals as included within the military-necessity
doctrine by the mid-1800s. In Wiggins v. United States, the Court of
Claims awarded compensation to an individual, not associated with
enemy forces, whose gunpowder was ordered destroyed by a com-
mander of the U.S. Army.79 The destruction occurred as 21,000 pounds
of gunpowder, stored in Punta Arena, Costa Rica, were awaiting sale to
the Nicaraguan government.80 The storage facility was near a company
where U.S. citizens worked on transporting passengers and freight.8 '
The army justified destroying the property as a means of preventing an
invasion by Nicaraguan inhabitants, as revenge for earlier conflicts with
the United States, and for injuries to U.S. citizens who worked in the
company.82
Later case law continued to characterize the military-necessity doc-
trine as allowing for "full compensation to the owner," especially if the
danger was "immediate and impending" or if "the necessity [was] urgent
for public service. '83 The military-necessity doctrine was premised on
the emergency: "It is the emergency that gives the right, and the emer-
gency must be shown to exist before the taking can be justified."84
Property that was not seized in light of danger, to defend, to place troops
in a safer place, or to anticipate the attack of an approaching enemy, was
held not to involve military necessity. 8
5
78. Carnahan, supra note 37, at 227.
79. Wiggins v. United States (The Wiggin's Case), 3 Ct. Cl. 412, 421-23 (1867).
80. Id. at 420-21.
81. Id. at 421.
82. Id. The Court of Claims also granted compensation in Grant v. United States, I Ct. Cl. 41
(1863), which involved buildings and supplies located in Arizona and destroyed by U.S. troops to
prevent capture by the enemy, the Confederate forces. Id. at 40-50. The property was owned by
a government contractor who furnished commissary and supplies for the forts and military posts in
Arizona. Id. at 41. The taking was, according to the decision, one of public exigency by a
military officer governed by the law of eminent domain. Id. at 44-47. The Court of Claims
distinguished military necessity by noting that eminent domain rights are different from cases
involving an "overruling necessity." Id. at 45. The latter was defined by the Court as a "natural
right, older than States .... The one may be fettered by constitutional limitations-the other is
beyond the reach of constitutions." Id.
83. Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 134 (1851) ("[W]here the owner has done
nothing to forfeit his rights, every public officer is bound to respect them, whether he finds the
property in a foreign or hostile country, or in his own.").
84. Id.
85. Id. at 135 (finding that the seizure of horses, mules, wagons, goods, chattels, and
merchandise of a U.S. trader seized in 1847 during the Mexican American War did not involve a
necessity because its purpose was to "insure the success of a distant and hazardous expedition").
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The doctrine of military necessity was specifically limited as one
excluding compensation beginning with Perrin v. United States.86 Per-
rin, termed by the Federal Circuit in El-Shifa as "a seminal case in th[is]
decisional law,"87 began a series of cases where courts indicated that the
safety of the state outweighed all considerations of private loss.8 8 Spe-
cifically, according to the El-Shifa court, the Perrin court distinguished
"between the civil power of eminent domain comprehended by the Fifth
Amendment, and the exercise of military power which falls outside it."89
Perrin involved merchandise owned by a naturalized U.S. citizen
and her husband.9" The merchandise was shipped to San Juan, Nicara-
gua for storage.91 On July 13, 1854, by order of the President, U.S.
Navy forces attacked the town, and the "town was totally destroyed,"
including Mrs. Perrin's goods.9 2 The Court of Claims denied Mrs. Per-
rin's claim for just compensation and dismissed the suit, noting that
[n]o government, except as a special favor bestowed, has ever paid
for the property of even its own citizens in its own country destroyed
in attacking or defending against a common public enemy; much less
is any government bound to pay for the property of neutrals domi-
ciled in the country of its enemy, which its forces may chance to
destroy in its operations against such enemy.93
In making this determination, the Perrin court distinguished
between prior cases where compensation had been awarded for property
destroyed to prevent it from falling into the hands of the public enemy,
vis-A-vis property destroyed in hostile operations against the public
enemy. 94 Specifically, in cases involving damage or destruction of
property caused by necessary military operations of the army during
war, or measures taken for the troops' safety and efficiency, no compen-
sation is owed. 95
Following Perrin, the principle that the government is not responsi-
ble "for injuries to or destruction of private property in necessary mili-
86. 4 Ct. Cl. 543, 547-48 (1868).
87. EI-Shifa 11, 378 F.3d 1346, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
88. E.g., United States v. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 154 (1952).
89. El Shifa 1, 55 Fed. Cl. 751, 768 (2003).
90. 4 Ct. Cl. at 546 ("The claimant and her husband, Mr. Trautman Perrin, were French
subjects, temporarily domiciled at Greytown [but Mrs. Perrin had become a naturalized American
citizen].").
91. Id.
92. Id. at 547 ("A large portion of the place was battered down by the guns of the ship, and
then a party was sent on shore to apply the torch, and complete by burning what had escaped the
bombardment.").
93. Id. at 547-48.
94. Id. at 547 (citing Wiggins v. United States (The Wiggins's Case), 3 Ct. CI. 412, 421
(1867); Grant v. United States, I Ct. Cl. 41, 49-50 (1863)).
95. Perrin, 4 Ct. Cl. at 547-48.
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tary operations during the civil war, . . . [was] thus considered
established."96 Later cases merely polished the contours of the doctrine.
In United States v. Pacific Railroad, a case considered by the Federal
Circuit as one discussing the enemy-property doctrine, the U.S. Supreme
Court examined the destruction of some bridges by Union Forces during
the Civil War.97 The military had destroyed certain bridges to impede
the advance of the Confederate Army and then repaired some but not all
of the bridges.98 The Court found that the government could not be held
liable under the Fifth Amendment for the destruction of the bridges:99
The destruction or injury of private property in battle, or in the bom-
bardment of cities and towns, and in many other ways in the war, had
to be borne by the sufferers alone, as one of its consequences.
Whatever would embarrass or impede the advance of the enemy, as
the breaking up of roads, or the burning of bridges, or would cripple
and defeat him, as destroying his means of subsistence, were lawfully
ordered by the commanding general. Indeed, it was his imperative
duty to direct their destruction. The necessities of the war called for
and justified this."°°
The U.S. Supreme Court expressly identified this rule enunciated in
Pacific Railroad as binding law nearly seventy years later. 10 1 In United
States v. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., a case relied upon by the Federal Circuit,
the U.S. Supreme Court declined to award compensation to an oil com-
pany in the Philippines that had a facility that was requisitioned by the
U.S. Army after Pearl Harbor.'1 2 The destruction was justified as a mili-
tary necessity in light of the enemy's approach to the city.10 3 The facil-
ity was "rendered useless to the enemy" and the "enemy was deprived of
a valuable logistic weapon."'" Moreover, because the property was
destroyed and "not appropriated for subsequent use," the case thus fell
within the rule "that in wartime many losses must be attributed solely to
96. United States v. Pac. R.R., 120 U.S. 227, 239 (1887) (noting that compensation provided
in prior cases was generally stated by the President to be "a matter of bounty rather than of strict
legal right").
97. Id. at 229-32.
98. Id. at 229.
99. Id. at 233-40. The U.S. Supreme Court further noted that in cases where the government
could not be charged for injuries or destruction of property, the reverse was also true: "[P]rivate
parties cannot be charged for works constructed on their lands by the government to further the
operations of its armies." Id. at 239. Thus, the railroad company need not reimburse the
government for expenses incurred in repairing some of the bridges. Id.
100. Id. at 234.
101. United States v. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 154 (1952) ("Whether or not the
principle laid down by Mr. Justice Field [in Pacific Railroad] was dictum when he enunciated it,
we hold that it is law today.").
102. Id. at 150-56.
103. Id. at 153-54.
104. Id. at 151.
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the fortunes of war, and not to the sovereign."' 5 The reluctance of
courts to award compensation in cases following Perrin demonstrates
that the earlier understanding of the doctrine as one providing for com-
pensation became the exception rather than the default.
Military necessity, however, is a narrow principle. Courts have
found military necessity inapplicable in cases where property of loyal
citizens is taken for the service and subsequent use of the army.1"6
Examples include vessels or steamboats used for transport of troops and
munitions, or buildings used for warehousing and storage. 10 7 For exam-
ple, the U.S. Supreme Court found that an urgent necessity did not exist
in Mitchell v. Harmony, a case where property was seized to ensure the
success of a military expedition. 0 8 Although the Court acknowledged
that it is impossible to define the particular circumstances of danger or
necessity in which the power of military necessity may be lawfully exer-
cised, the property in this case was not seized to defend, to place troops
in a safer place, or to anticipate an attack. 10 9 The Court later distin-
guished Mitchell and a similar case noting that "[i]n neither was the
Army's purpose limited.., to the sole objective of destroying property
of strategic value to prevent the enemy from using it to wage war the
more successfully."11
Nevertheless, military necessity does include cases where an indi-
vidual suffers property loss from governmental conduct dictated by a
military objective-so long as the purposes are proper objectives.111 As
stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Central Eureka
Mining Co., so long as damages are incidental to the government's law-
ful regulation of matters reasonably deemed essential to the war effort,
no compensation is owed.1 12 The military objective in Central Eureka,
supporting the government's requirement that nonessential gold mines
be closed down, was to conserve equipment and labor during war."'
In addition, a formal declaration of war is not necessary to deny
compensation under the military-necessity doctrine. In National Board
of Young Men's Christian Associations v. United States, the Court of
Claims considered destruction of and damage to properties in the Pan-
ama Canal Zone after a riot in 1964 as falling outside the confines of the
105. Id. at 155-56 (citations omitted).
106. See id. at 153.
107. See United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 623, 627-28 (1871).
108. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 134-35 (1851).
109. Id. at 135.
110, Caltex, 344 U.S. at 153 (citing Russell, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 627-28; Mitchell, 54 U.S.
(13 How.) at 129-30, 134-35).
111. United States v. Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 169 (1958).
112. Id.
113. Id.
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Fifth Amendment." 4 Although the United States was not at war with
the Republic of Panama at the time, U.S. Army troops were using the
private property as refuge during a sustained attack by a mob under con-
ditions presenting immediate danger to the lives of U.S. citizens."15
Cases discussing the military-necessity doctrine provide certain
parameters; nevertheless, whether a constitutional taking is not compen-
sable is a question ultimately turning upon the particular circumstances
of each case." 16 There are no certain guidelines defining military neces-
sity.1 7 However, prime situations supporting a taking under the mili-
tary-necessity doctrine include the purposeful and necessary destruction
of property for the safety of troops or to meet an emergency threatening
great public danger." 8 In these cases, courts have consistently found
that cases where civilian property has been destroyed or expropriated
fall outside the Fifth Amendment. 19
The Federal Circuit's application of military-necessity principles to
the enemy-property doctrine in El-Shifa may be justified primarily
because President Clinton alleged the destruction was necessary to
secure national self-defense. 2 ° However, the analysis of El-Shifa and
any other necessity case under the label of the enemy-property doctrine
must meet the narrower parameters established by military-necessity
precedent.
First, military necessity is limited to those military destructions or
appropriations where "the public danger must be immediate, imminent,
and impending."'' Whether E1-Shifa satisfies the requirements of the
military-necessity doctrine is thus a question that must be based on the
nature of the problem faced, not on the conduct undertaken. Second,
military necessity condones purposeful interference with the property of
another, not circumstances where the property is destroyed errone-
ously. '2 The application of the military-necessity doctrine to the
enemy-property doctrine will be unjustified if used to support accidental,
erroneous, or unintentional destruction of property. Third, military-
necessity principles do not support the destruction of property on the
114. 396 F.2d 467, 468, 470-71, 475 (Ct. CI. 1968).
115. Id. at 470-71.
116. See Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. at 168; United States v. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., 344
U.S. 149, 156 (1952).
117. See Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. at 168; Caltex, 344 U.S. at 156.
118. See, e.g., United States v. Pac. R.R., 120 U.S. 227, 234 (1887); Nat'l Bd. of Young Men's
Christian Ass'ns, 396 F.2d at 472; Perrin v. United States, 4 Ct. C1. 543, 547-48 (1868).
119. See, e.g., Pac. R.R., 120 U.S. at 234; Nat'l Bd. of Young Men's Christian Ass'ns, 396 F.3d
at 472; Perrin, 4 Ct. C1. at 547-48; see also El-Shifa 1, 55 Fed. CI. 751, 765 (2003).
120. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
121. United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 623, 628 (1871).
122. See, e.g., Perrin, 4 Ct. CI. at 547-48.
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basis that the property was targeted or mislabeled as enemy property.
Property taken or appropriated from friendly claimants may fall under
the rubric of the military-necessity doctrine. 23 Hence, neither EI-Shifa
nor other cases under the enemy-property doctrine can be supported
under military necessity on the basis that the property is enemy. The
controlling factor is whether there is a military necessity that can be
justified.
In conclusion, the enemy-property doctrine may borrow military-
necessity principles to the extent that they do not exceed "the allowable
limits of military discretion."' 24 And this analysis must be conducted
carefully. As former Chief Justice Rehnquist once stated, "[i]t is all too
easy to slide from a case of genuine military necessity ... to one where
the threat is not critical and the power either dubious or nonexistent."' 25
IV. THE ALIEN-ENEMY DISABILITY RULE
Another doctrine limiting the right to receive just compensation for
military takings is the alien-enemy disability rule. The Federal Circuit,
in addition to borrowing military-necessity principles to create the
enemy-property doctrine, also relied on the alien-enemy rule. This rule
must be considered as a separate and distinct obstacle in a military tak-
ings claim.
Under the alien-enemy disability rule, destruction of property
owned by alien enemies "engaged in the hostile service of a government
at war with the United States" is not protected by the Takings Clause.
126
This is a conceded right. 127 As recognized by the Federal Circuit in El-
Shifa, a contrary rule would require the government to provide compen-
sation for the destruction of, for example, a vehicle used to engage the
army in battle.' 28 This struck the court as "absurd in the extreme." 129
The Court of Claims has also expressed similar sentiments: "[W]hen a
man goes into a foreign country to reside, or when he acquires property
there, or holds commercial intercourse with its inhabitants, he is bound
to contemplate the possibility of a war between that country and his
own, and must so conduct his affairs as always to be ready for the conse-
123. See Wiggins v. United States (The Wiggin's Case), 3 Ct. Cl. 412, 421-23 (1867).
124. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 401 (1932).
125. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIvIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 224-25
(1998).
126. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 785 (1950).
127. Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. 268, 305 (1871); see also Johnson, 339 U.S. at 776
("[T]he nonresident enemy alien, especially one who has remained in the service of the enemy,
does not have even this qualified access to our courts, for he neither has comparable claims upon
our institutions nor could his use of them fail to be helpful to the enemy.").
128. EI-Shifa H, 378 F.3d 1346, 1355-56 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
129. Id. at 1356.
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quences."'' 30 The confiscation is not undertaken because of any criminal
activity, but because of the relation of the property to the enemy. 31
Proper application of the alien-enemy disability rule depends on the
existence of an enemy target. Friendly individuals or their property do
not excuse the government from liability under the "alien enemy"
rule.' 32 There are several approaches to defining alien enemies. Con-
gress has defined them as "'natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of [a]
hostile nation or government' with which the United States is engaged in
a 'declared war.' 1 33 Another piece of legislation considered by courts
is the Abandoned and Captured Property Act, which authorizes the cap-
ture of hostile property even though owned by private persons.' 34
Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has provided interpretations of
the alien-enemy disability rule using principles of international law.135
Courts have considered alien enemies to be enemies at war with the
United States in a foreign jurisdiction' 36 or within the United States. 137
For instance, in Johnson v. Eisentrager, the U.S. Supreme Court
reviewed a case involving German nationals who were captured and
confined overseas in a U.S. military court as enemy aliens.1 38 In deny-
ing the enemy aliens a right to a writ of habeas corpus, Justice Jackson
explained that if the Fifth Amendment provided enemy aliens with
immunity from military trial, it would put people engaged in unlawful
hostile action in a more protected position than our own soldiers.1 39 The
Court viewed the enemy alien's motives as a matter of allegiance:
The alien enemy is bound by an allegiance which commits him to
lose no opportunity to forward the cause of our enemy; hence the
United States, assuming him to be faithful to his allegiance, regards
him as part of the enemy resources. It therefore takes measures to
130. Green v. United States (Green's Case), 10 Ct. Cl. 466, 471 (1874).
131. See Juragua Iron Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 297, 306 (1909).
132. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 769 (1950).
133. Nathaniel Segal, After EI-Shifa: The Extraterritorial Availability of the Takings Clause,
13 CARDOZO J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 293, 333 n.158 (2005) (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 21 (2002)).
134. Lamar v. Browne, 92 U.S. 187, 193 (1875).
135. See Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 198 (1815) ("The law of
nations is the great source from which we derive those rules, respecting belligerent and neutral
rights, which are recognized by all civilized and commercial states throughout Europe and
America. This law is in part unwritten, and in part conventional."); see also Juragua Iron Co., 212
U.S. at 308-09 ("A person, though not a resident in a country, may be so associated with it
through having or being a partner in a house of trade as to be affected by its enemy character, in
respect at least, of the property which he possesses in the belligerent territory.") (quoting WiLr
EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 500, 504, 533 (5th ed. 1904)).
136. See, e.g., Johnson, 339 U.S. at 765-66, 785.
137. See, e.g., Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 489 (1931); Turney v.
United States, 115 F. Supp. 457, 464 (Ct. Cl. 1953).
138. 339 U.S. at 765-66, 785.
139. Id. at 783, 785.
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disable him from commission of hostile acts imputed as his intention
because they are a duty to his sovereign. 140
The Johnson Court also provided a concise definition of alien ene-
mies: "In the primary meaning of the words, an alien friend is the sub-
ject of a foreign state at peace with the United States; an alien enemy is
the subject of a foreign state at war with the United States."' Other
definitions provided for an enemy include "one seeking to injure, over-
throw, or confound an opponent"14 1 or "[a] state with which another
state is at war." '143 Furthermore, in war, everyone in enemy country is
an enemy."'
And with regard to property, "[a]ll property within enemy territory
is in law enemy property, just as all persons in the same territory are
enemies. '  Property can become "enemy property by virtue of its
location in hostile territory."' 4 6 Even someone who is neutral and
"own[s] property within the enemy's lines, holds it as enemy property,
subject to the laws of war; and, if it is hostile property, subject to cap-
ture."' 47 Hence, cotton located in Confederate territory, but belonging
to a British citizen, was found to be a legitimate subject of capture.' 48
Moreover, the personal or commercial character of the owner is not
determinative.' 49 In Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, for instance,
Chief Justice Marshall considered a sugar plantation located in a Danish
island seized by England in the War of 1812 as enemy property. 5° The
sugar was captured as it was being transported by sea. 5 ' The owner of
the property argued that the sugar was erroneously labeled enemy prop-
erty because he had never incorporated himself with the interests of
England; he was Danish by birth, and he did not voluntarily purchase a
plantation in an enemy country.1 52 In denying these claims and classify-
ing the property as enemy, the Court noted that it was subject to capture
because it derived from enemy soil. 53  As Chief Justice Marshall
explained,
[i]t is no extravagant perversion of principle, nor is it a violent
140. Id. at 772-73.
141. Id. at 769 n.2 (citation omitted).
142. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 412 (1984).
143. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 569 (8th ed. 2004).
144. Lamar v. Browne, 92 U.S. 187, 194 (1875).
145. Young v. United States, 97 U.S. 39, 60 (1877).
146. El Shifa 1, 55 Fed. CI. 751, 767 (2003).
147. Young, 97 U.S. at 60.
148. Id. at 58.
149. See Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 197-98 (1815).
150. Id. at 195.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 197.
153. Id. at 199.
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offence to the course of human opinion to say that the proprietor, so
far as respects his interests in this land, partakes of its character; and
that the produce, while the owner remains unchanged, is subject to
the same disabilities.
154
The character of the land can provide the status of enemy to nonres-
ident aliens and citizens alike. As the U.S. Supreme Court has stated,
"[f]or the purposes of capture, property found in enemy territory is
enemy property, without regard to the status of the owner." '155 For
example, property of a U.S. corporation doing business in Cuba was
designated as enemy property. 156 Finally, property subject to confisca-
tion for its enemy status is not limited only to tangible items. In Green
v. United States, the Court of Claims upheld the confiscation of rents
when, before the capture of the city by Union troops, a landlord of a
building in Tennessee voluntarily entered and remained in Confederate
territory. '57
As the cases illustrate, the alien-enemy doctrine is widely recog-
nized. However, the government cannot avoid the Takings Clause by
using the military as a cover for activities that would otherwise be com-
pensable if performed by one of its civilian agencies.' 8 For instance,
military aircraft overflights that do not result in the destruction or appro-
priation of enemy property may constitute valid takings claims.' 59 The
key ingredient of the doctrine is the existence of an alien enemy. In fact,
this principle was reaffirmed in Seery v. United States.160 In that case,
the U.S. Army confiscated a naturalized citizen's house in Austria in
1945, along with his furniture, china, glassware, silver, rugs, paintings,
and objects of art.1 61 The army converted the house and used it as an
officers' club for social and recreational purposes months after hostili-
154. Id.
155. Lamar v. Browne, 92 U.S. 187, 194 (1877).
156. See, e.g., El-Shifa 1, 55 Fed. Cl. 751, 767 (2003) (citing Juragua Iron Co. v. United States,
42 Ct. CI. 99, 111-12 (1907)).
157. Green v. United States (Green's Case), 10 Ct. Cl. 466, 474 (1874). The court justified the
confiscation noting that
in law he cannot be clothed with this twofold character; he cannot be regarded as a
loyal citizen of the United States and as a public enemy. The criminal portion of his
case we put entirely out of view, and regard him simply in his self-assumed
character of a public enemy. The facts upon which his case must now be adjudged
are strictly these: that he was domiciled within the insurrectionary district when the
war began and that he voluntarily entered and remained within the enemy's lines
until it ended.
Id. at 472.
158. EI-Shifa 11, 378 F.3d at 1356 (citing Argent v. United States, 124 F.3d 1277, 1281-85
(Fed. Cir. 1997)).
159. Id.
160. 127 F. Supp. 601, 605-06 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
161. Id. at 602-03.
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ties in the area had ended. 162 The government claimed that, according to
international law, property located in Austria at that time was enemy
property. 163 In awarding just compensation, the Court of Claims dis-
agreed with the government and found that the property was not in
enemy territory. 164 The German Armed Forces had surrendered some
months before, and there were no enemy activities in Austria. 165 Moreo-
ver, several sources found to be controlling, including a Department of
State bulletin, a presidential address, and other declarations, named Aus-
tria as a "liberated area."' 66 The fact that allied forces maintained occu-
pation in Austria to prevent possible pro-Nazi uprisings was immaterial
to an enemy designation.
1 67
The Federal Circuit in El Shifa H reaffirmed the trial court's finding
that the alien-enemy disability rule contributed to the enemy-property
doctrine because President Clinton targeted El-Shifa as an enemy mili-
tary facility.168 However, the enemy-property doctrine's use of alien-
enemy principles presupposes the existence of an enemy target. As
Seery demonstrates, the controlling factor in determining whether a Tak-
ings Clause reaches military conduct is whether there was destruction or
appropriation of property falling within the definition of "enemy. 1 69
This depends in part on circumstances such as whether the taking
occurred during wartime, the character of the military activity, and the
U.S. foreign policy with respect to the country in question. 7 ° As the
Federal Circuit recognized, "[m]ilitary conduct that does not touch on
the destruction or appropriation of enemy property can sometimes give
rise to a valid takings claim." 7 ' In El-Shifa, the Federal Circuit
declined to decide whether the designation of the facility as enemy prop-
erty was erroneous. Instead, the court found that the issue concerned a
nonjusticiable political question. 72 Nevertheless, the court's opinion
does suggest that in applying alien-enemy principles to the enemy-prop-
erty doctrine, future litigants should exercise caution in limiting the doc-
trine to cases where the target may satisfy the criteria for an "enemy"
designation.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 606.
164. Id. at 605.
165. Id. at 606.
166. Id. at 604-05 (citations omitted).
167. Id. at 606.
168. 378 F.3d 1346, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
169. 127 F. Supp. at 605-06.
170. See id.
171. EI-Shifa 11, 378 F.3d at 1356 (citing Argent v. United States, 124 F.3d 1277, 1281-85
(Fed. Cir. 1997)).
172. Id. at 1365.
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V. APPLICATION OF TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE ABROAD
An evaluation of takings jurisprudence in the context of nonresi-
dent aliens and foreign property is necessary to better understand the
enemy-property doctrine. The U.S. Supreme Court in Reid v. Covert
adopted the current view that constitutional protections apply to U.S.
citizens in foreign jurisdictions. 73 In addition, an alien can bring a just
compensation claim if the taking occurs within the United States. 174
Nevertheless, the Fifth Amendment's application to alien property
located outside the United States is unclear. Because the Takings Clause
does not provide otherwise and because it can be enforced without
inconvenience or practical difficulty, some courts have reasoned that it
should apply to foreign-owned, foreign-located property. 175 Precedent,
however, shows that this rule is not clearly established. 176
Beginning with Johnson v. Eisentrager, a pre-Reid decision, the
U.S. Supreme Court indicated that alien enemies may not bring a civil
action in the United States. 77 In 1953 the Court of Claims held in
Turney v. United States that the U.S. Army's seizure of a Fillipino cor-
poration's radar equipment constituted a taking for which the United
States owed just compensation. 178 In rejecting the government's argu-
ment that the Fifth Amendment did not apply in foreign countries, the
court recognized that there was no decision directly on point. 17
In the 1990 case of United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, the U.S.
Supreme Court rejected a claim that the Fourth Amendment applied to a
warrantless search of a Mexican citizen's home in Mexico. 8° The
plaintiff in that case relied in part on settled precedent indicating that the
right to just compensation for property taken by the United States was
available to nonresident aliens.' 8 ' Nevertheless, the Court stated that
173. 354 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1957) ('This Court and other federal courts have held or asserted that
various constitutional limitations apply to the Government when it acts outside the continental
United States. While it has been suggested that only those constitutional rights which are
'fundamental' protect Americans abroad, we can find no warrant, in logic or otherwise, for
picking and choosing among the remarkable collection of 'Thou shalt nots' which were explicitly
fastened on all departments and agencies of the Federal Government by the Constitution and its
Amendments.") (citations omitted).
174. Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 489 (1931).
175. See, e.g., Seery v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 601, 605-06 (Ct. Cl. 1955) (rejecting
argument that just compensation claims should be dismissed because private property at issue was
located in Austria); Turney v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 457, 464 (Ct. Cl. 1953) (noting that a
just compensation claim can apply to property located abroad).
176. See, e.g., EI-Shifa 11, 378 F.3d at 1351-52; Turney, 115 F. Supp. at 463-64.
177. 339 U.S. 763, 776 (1950).
178. 115 F. Supp. at 463-64.
179. Id. at 464.
180. 494 U.S. 259, 274-75 (1990).
181. Id. at 271.
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previous cases established "only that aliens receive constitutional protec-
tions when they have come within the territory of the United States and
developed substantial connections with the country. Respondent is an
alien who has had no previous significant voluntary connection with the
United States, so these cases avail him not."1 82
According to the Federal Circuit's recent pronouncement in El-
Shifa II, Verdugo-Urquidez and Turney conflict.' 83 Indeed, as the Fed-
eral Circuit suggests, the U.S. Supreme Court's reading in Verdugo-
Urquidez purportedly overrules Turney, suggesting that stronger volun-
tary connections to the United States are necessary before a claimant can
invoke constitutional protections.' 84 The Federal Circuit, however,
declined the invitation to overrule Turney.185 Furthermore, the Court
refused to clarify this area of the law when it denied certiorari to hear El-
Shifa's appeal. 186 As a result, the requirements for the extraterritorial
applicability of the Fifth Amendment to the enemy-property doctrine
remain unclear.
VI. COMMENT: WHAT Is THE ENEMY-PROPERTY DOCTRINE?
The Federal Circuit's opinion in El-Shifa II initiated a novel inquiry
into the meaning of the enemy-property doctrine. Although the Federal
Circuit did not precisely define the scope of the enemy-property doc-
trine, it is clear that the doctrine was not created using a blank canvas.
The El-Shifa II court borrowed principles derived from at least two long-
standing takings doctrines to create this new doctrine. However, as this
note illustrates, both of these borrowed doctrines-the military-necessity
doctrine and the alien-enemy disability rule-present separate and dis-
tinct obstacles for litigants seeking compensation in a military-takings
action.
Military necessity "separates losses that are necessary incidents of
the ravages and burdens of war from those situations where the Govern-
ment is obliged to pay compensation to the owner of private property
that is taken for public use."'1 87 Military necessity does not excuse gov-
ernmental liability on the basis that the property is enemy. Rather, there
must be an exigency supporting the military action.'88 The key factor
182. Id. (citations omitted).
183. EI-Shifa II, 378 F.3d 1346, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
184. Id.
185. Id. (citing George E. Warren Corp. v. United States, 341 F.3d 1348, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2003)).
186. See El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 545 U.S. 1139 (2005).
187. Nat'l Bd. of the Young Men's Christian Ass'ns v. United States, 396 F.2d 467, 471 (Ct.
Cl. 1968).
188. United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 623, 628 (1871).
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under any military-necessity claim is the existence of a necessary
destruction or appropriation.' 89 On the other hand, as the Federal Cir-
cuit recognized, "the United States does not have to answer under the
Takings Clause for the destruction of enemy property or, . . . 'enemy
war-making instrumentalities."' ' 190 The latter exception provides the
basis for the alien-enemy destruction rule.' 91 Under this principle, the
Fifth Amendment is not suspended in cases where friendly property is
destroyed.192
The Federal Circuit's use of the military-necessity and alien-enemy
doctrines to approach the situation presented by El-Shifa is not unex-
pected. The El-Shifa case deals with the destruction by the military of
asserted enemy property to protect the nation because the President
determined this operation was necessary to secure national self-
defense. 93 The government may avoid liability under the military-
necessity doctrine or by virtue of the President's designation of El-Shifa
as an enemy military facility.
94
Indeed, El-Shifa is not the first case that involves a double
whammy. In Juragua Iron Co. v. United States, a U.S. corporation
doing business in Cuba, an enemy territory during the Spanish-American
War, could not obtain just compensation when all "places of occupation
or habitation which might contain [yellow] fever germs" were ordered
destroyed. 95 Because the destruction was deemed necessary to preserve
the health of U.S. troops engaged in operations in Cuba, the Court
invoked the military-necessity doctrine. 196 In addition, the Court
deemed the corporation's property as enemy property because it was
domiciled in Cuba, the enemy's country. 97
A neutral, or a citizen of the United States, domiciled in the enemy's
country, not only in respect to his property, but also as to his capacity
to sue, is deemed as much an alien enemy as a person actually born
under the allegiance and residing within the dominions of the hostile
189. See, e.g., United States v. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 155 (1952) (finding
destruction of facilities storing oil a necessary deprivation of a "potential weapon of great
significance to the invader"); Juragua Iron Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 297, 301, 305-06 (1909)
(noting that the destruction of property was necessary to preserve the health of the troops and
prevent the spread of disease among them); see also supra notes 62-112 and accompanying text.
190. EI-Shifa I, 378 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
191. See id.
192. Seery v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 601, 605-06 (Ct. CI. 1955).
193. 378 F.3d at 1349.
194. See id. at 1363-64.
195. 212 U.S. 297, 301, 308 (1909).
196. Id. at 301.
197. Id. at 305-06.
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nation.198
The difference between El-Shifa and Juragua concerns the Federal
Circuit's decision to consider El Shifa under a new doctrine. This is
problematic because military necessity and the alien-enemy rule are two
narrow and distinct principles. Neither the military-necessity doctrine
nor the alien-enemy rule can be combined to support a categorical
exception in a case like El-Shifa. To avoid liability under the Fifth
Amendment, the government must satisfy the elements of either the mil-
itary-necessity or the alien-enemy rule, or both. If El-Shifa does not
involve a necessity justifying the destruction, the enemy-property doc-
trine cannot bar a takings claim unless the property destroyed was that of
an enemy. Hence, the enemy-property doctrine is an illogical extension
of military-conduct exceptions to takings jurisprudence to the extent it
blurs the narrow parameters of the military-necessity doctrine or the
alien-enemy rule. Furthermore, as demonstrated by the cases discussing
the applicability of the Fifth Amendment to individuals like Mr. Idris, a
nonresident alien whose property was destroyed abroad, it is unsettled
whether strong voluntary connections, as required by Verdugo-
Urquidez, are a prerequisite to a successful takings claim. 199 This aspect
of the enemy-property doctrine was undecided by the Federal Circuit
and remains unsettled.2"
A fair definition of the enemy-property doctrine is broad, serving as
an umbrella for narrower situations where the United States does not
have to answer under the Takings Clause. Nevertheless, future applica-
tions of the enemy-property doctrine should require a fair examination
of both the military-necessity doctrine and the alien-enemy disability
rule. The threshold requirements created by cases examining military-
necessity and alien-enemy principles should be considered distinct limi-
tations to colorable takings claims. In conclusion, the notion that tak-
ings claims for military destructions or appropriations will be more
successful as a result of the birth of the enemy-property doctrine should
be rejected.
198. Id. at 308 (quoting WILLIAM WHITING, WAR POWERS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 340, 342 (43d ed., Lee & Shepard 1871)).
199. See supra notes 173-80 and accompanying text.
200. El-Shifa II, 378 F.3d 1346, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
